What Is Anglo German Agreement
For its part, the German Government believes that the agreement on which it has just concluded with Her Majesty`s Government in the United Kingdom and which it considers to be a permanent and final agreement with effect today between the two governments will facilitate the conclusion of a general agreement on this issue between all the maritime powers of the world. 3. Referring to paragraph (c) of the above explanations, I have the honour to inform you that Her Majesty`s Government in the United Kingdom has taken note of the reservation and recognized it in the law set out in it, bearing in mind that the 35:100 report is maintained in agreement with the contrary between the two governments. The Helgoland-Zanzibar Treaty (German: Helgoland-Zanzibar Treaty) was an agreement signed on 1 July 1890 between the German Empire and Great Britain. The Anglo-German naval agreement was an ambitious attempt by both the British and Germans to secure better relations, but ultimately failed due to conflicting expectations between the two countries. For Germany, the Anglo-German naval agreement was to mark the beginning of an Anglo-German alliance against France and the Soviet Union, while for Britain, the Anglo-German naval agreement was to be the beginning of a series of arms control agreements concluded to limit German expansionism. The Anglo-German naval agreement was controversial at the time and since then, because the tonnage of 35:100 allowed Germany to build a navy beyond the borders set by the Treaty of Versaille, and London had concluded the agreement without consultation with Paris or Rome. In early March 1935, talks on the extent and extent of German rearmament between Hitler and Simon in Berlin were postponed when Hitler was offended by a British government white paper justifying a higher defence budget on the grounds that Germany was violating the Treaty of Versaille, claiming that it had been “cold”. Between Hitler`s “rest” and Simon`s visit, the German government took the opportunity to formally reject all Versailles clauses on land and air disarmament. In the 1930s, the British government was obsessed with the idea of a German bomb attack that destroyed London and therefore insisted on an air pact banning bombing. The idea of a maritime agreement was seen as a useful stepping stone to an air pact.  On 26 March 1935, during one of his meetings with Simon and his deputy Anthony Eden, Hitler declared his intention to refuse the naval disarmament service at Versailles, but was prepared to discuss a treaty that regulates the extent of German naval armament.  On 21 May 1935, in a speech in Berlin, Hitler formally proposed to discuss a contract proposing a German navy that would operate forever on a 35:100 naval stand.  In his “Peace Speech” of May 21, Hitler denied any intention to engage with the United Kingdom in a sea-style battle before 1914 and said: “The German government itself recognizes the overwhelming importance of existence and therefore the justification of supremacy at sea to protect the British Empire, just as we are determined on the other hand to do whatever is necessary to protect our continental existence and freedom.”  For Hitler, his speech illustrated the underperformance of an Anglo-German alliance, the UK`s acceptance of the German Continental European Championship in exchange for German acceptance of British domination of the seas.  At a cabinet meeting on 3 May 1939, the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Stanhope, stated that “Germany, at this stage, was building ships as fast as possible, but would not be able to exceed the quota of 35 per cent until 1942 or 1943.”  Chatfield, now Defence Minister, said Hitler had “convinced” himself that the UK had given the UK a “carte blanche” in Eastern Europe in exchange for the deal.  Chamberlain stated that the United Kingdom had never shown such understanding to Germany, and noted that, during his meeting with the Fuhrer at the Berchtesgaden Summit in September 1938, he first obtained Hitler`s faith in such an unspoken agreement.